

# Independence, Mixture Space Theorem, and von Neumann & Morgenstern Expected Utility Theorem

Econ 3030

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## Lecture 9

### Outline

- 1 Convex Consumption Set and Independence
- 2 Mixture Space Theorem
- 3 Preferences Over Lotteries
- 4 von-Neuman & Morgenstern Expected Utility

## Expected Utility

- There are  $n$  **fixed** mutually exclusive outcomes denoted  $x_1, \dots, x_n$ .
- A probability distribution over these outcomes is  $\pi = (\pi_1, \dots, \pi_n)$ .
- Since the outcomes are fixed, **the consumer evaluates different probability distributions over outcomes**.
- The expected utility function is

$$U(\pi) = \sum_{i=1}^n \pi_i v(x_i).$$

where each outcome  $x_i$  has utility  $v(x_i)$ .

- If we let  $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$  and  $\mathbf{v}(\mathbf{x}) = (v(x_1), \dots, v(x_n))$ , we can rewrite this as

$$U(\pi) = \pi \cdot \mathbf{v}(\mathbf{x})$$

### Remark

The representation theorem has to tell us that there exist a function  $v$  such that the utility function has the particular functional form given by  $U$ .

## Convex Consumption Space

- To obtain the representation in the previous slide, we need more than completeness, transitivity, and continuity.
  - This is intuitive since the utility function  $U(\cdot)$  has a very special functional form.
- We start by modifying the space over which consumption is defined.

### Consumption Set is Convex

The consumption set is a **convex** subset of  $\mathbb{R}^n$  denoted  $\Pi$ .

- Convexity means that  
if  $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \in \Pi$ , then  $\alpha \mathbf{x} + (1 - \alpha) \mathbf{y} \in \Pi$  for all  $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ .

### The Plan

- Start with preferences over an abstract convex space.
- Then, add more structure to get more specific results.

## Standard Assumptions

- As always, preferences must be complete and transitive

### Definition

A binary relation  $\succsim$  on  $\Pi$  is:

- **complete** if, for all  $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \in \Pi$ ,  $\mathbf{x} \succsim \mathbf{y}$  or  $\mathbf{y} \succsim \mathbf{x}$ , or both;
- **transitive** if, for all  $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z} \in \Pi$ ,  $\mathbf{x} \succsim \mathbf{y}$  and  $\mathbf{y} \succsim \mathbf{z}$  imply  $\mathbf{x} \succsim \mathbf{z}$ ;

## Archimedean Axiom

- Since the consumption space is convex, one can use a weaker version of continuity.

### Definition

A binary relation  $\succsim$  on  $\Pi$  is **Archimedean** if, for all  $\pi, \rho, \sigma \in \Pi$ ,

$$\pi \succ \rho \succ \sigma \implies \begin{cases} \exists \alpha \in (0, 1) \text{ such that } \alpha\pi + (1 - \alpha)\sigma \succ \rho \\ \text{and} \\ \exists \beta \in (0, 1) \text{ such that } \rho \succ \beta\pi + (1 - \beta)\sigma \end{cases}$$

### Exercise

Show that if  $\succsim$  is continuous then it is Archimedean.

### Exercise

Let  $\Pi = \mathbb{R}$  and let  $\succsim$  on  $\mathbb{R}$  defined by the utility function

$$U(\pi) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \pi > 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } \pi = 0 \\ -1 & \text{if } \pi < 0 \end{cases} \text{ .Verify that } \succsim \text{ is Archimedean but not continuous.}$$

## Independence

- A crucial new assumption yields additive separability of the representation.

### Definition

A binary relation  $\succsim$  on  $\Pi$  satisfies **independence** if, for all  $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z} \in \Pi$  and  $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ ,

$$\mathbf{x} \succsim \mathbf{y} \Leftrightarrow \alpha \mathbf{x} + (1 - \alpha) \mathbf{z} \succsim \alpha \mathbf{y} + (1 - \alpha) \mathbf{z}.$$

### Example

Suppose  $\Pi = \mathbb{R}^2$  and  $\succsim$  defined by

$$\mathbf{x} \succsim \mathbf{y} \text{ if and only if } x_1^2 + x_2^2 \geq y_1^2 + y_2^2$$

$\mathbf{x}$  is weakly preferred to  $\mathbf{y}$  whenever the norm of  $\mathbf{x}$  is weakly larger than the norm of  $\mathbf{y}$

Then  $(4, 0) \sim (0, 4)$ , but

$$\frac{1}{2}(4, 0) + \frac{1}{2}(2, 0) = (3, 0) \succ (1, 2) = \frac{1}{2}(0, 4) + \frac{1}{2}(2, 0)$$

So  $\succsim$  is not independent.

- What does independence imply geometrically?

## Consequences of Independence

### Proposition

*If a preference relation satisfies independence its indifference classes are convex.*

### Proof.

Suppose  $\succsim$  is independent. We need to show that

$$\pi \sim \sigma \Rightarrow \pi \sim \alpha\pi + (1 - \alpha)\sigma \sim \sigma, \forall \alpha \in [0, 1]$$

- If  $\pi \sim \sigma$ , clearly  $\pi \succsim \sigma$ . Thus, by independence, for all  $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ ,

$$\pi \succsim \sigma \Rightarrow \alpha\pi + (1 - \alpha)\pi \succsim \alpha\sigma + (1 - \alpha)\pi \Rightarrow \pi \succsim \alpha\sigma + (1 - \alpha)\pi.$$

- If  $\pi \sim \sigma$ , clearly  $\sigma \succsim \pi$ . Thus, by independence, for all  $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ ,

$$\sigma \succsim \pi \Rightarrow \alpha\sigma + (1 - \alpha)\pi \succsim \alpha\pi + (1 - \alpha)\pi \Rightarrow \alpha\sigma + (1 - \alpha)\pi \succsim \pi.$$

- Therefore we get  $\pi \sim \alpha\sigma + (1 - \alpha)\pi$  for all  $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ .
- The same logic shows that  $\sigma \sim \alpha\sigma + (1 - \alpha)\pi$ .
- Therefore the indifference classes are convex.



## Characterization of Independence

- The following provides an alternate characterization of independence, which is sometimes useful in proofs.

### Question 1, Problem Set 5.

Prove that a binary relation on  $\Pi$  is independent if and only if, for all  $\pi, \rho, \sigma \in \Pi$ , and  $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ ,

$$\pi \succ \rho \Leftrightarrow \alpha\pi + (1 - \alpha)\sigma \succ \alpha\rho + (1 - \alpha)\sigma$$

and

$$\pi \sim \rho \Leftrightarrow \alpha\pi + (1 - \alpha)\sigma \sim \alpha\rho + (1 - \alpha)\sigma$$



# Linear and Affine Functions

## Definition

A function  $f : \Pi \rightarrow \mathbf{R}$  is **affine** if, for all  $\pi, \rho \in \Pi$  and  $\alpha \in [0, 1]$

$$f(\alpha\pi + (1 - \alpha)\rho) = \alpha f(\pi) + (1 - \alpha)f(\rho).$$

## Definition

A function  $g : \mathbf{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbf{R}$  is **linear** if, for all  $\pi, \rho \in \mathbf{R}^n$  and  $\alpha, \beta \in \mathbf{R}$ ,

$$g(\alpha\pi + \beta\rho) = \alpha g(\pi) + \beta g(\rho).$$

## Exercise

Prove that a function  $g : \mathbf{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbf{R}$  is affine if and only if  $f(\pi) = g(\pi) - g(\mathbf{0}_n)$  is linear.

## Mixture Space Theorem

### Theorem (Mixture Space Theorem, Herstein and Milnor)

A binary relation  $\succsim$  on  $\Pi$  (a convex subset of  $\mathbb{R}^n$ ) is complete, transitive, independent and Archimedean if and only if there exists an affine function  $U : \Pi \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  such that

$$\pi \succsim \rho \Leftrightarrow U(\pi) \geq U(\rho)$$

Moreover, if  $U : \Pi \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  represents  $\succsim$ , then  $U' : \Pi \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  also represents  $\succsim$  if and only if there exist real numbers  $a > 0$  and  $b$  such that  $U'(\pi) = aU(\pi) + b$  for all  $\pi \in \Pi$ .

- The first part of the statement states that preferences are represented by an affine utility function, while the second says that this representation is unique up to linear transformations.

### Remarks

- This holds for any convex subset of an arbitrary vector space.
- The utility function  $U(\cdot)$  is cardinal and not just ordinal as before (Why?).
- The Mixture Space Theorem asserts that there exists **some** affine representation, not that **all** representations are affine.

### Theorem (Mixture Space Theorem, Herstein and Milnor)

*A binary relation  $\succsim$  on  $\Pi$  (a convex subset of  $\mathbb{R}^n$ ) is complete, transitive, independent and Archimedean if and only if there exists an affine function  $U : \Pi \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  representing  $\succsim$ :*

$$\pi \succsim \rho \Leftrightarrow U(\pi) \geq U(\rho)$$

*Moreover, this representation is unique up to affine transformations.*

- As with Debreu's utility representation proof, the main step is to find the unique number that is indifferent to a given  $\pi \in \Pi$ .
  - The main difference is that the assumptions now imply an affine utility function (rather than continuous one as in Debreu's theorem).
- Proof: Math class.
- Next we will see how this theorem, when used on special convex consumption sets, yields an expected utility representation.

## Preferences Over Lotteries (Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947))

- Let  $X = \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n\}$  be a finite set of size  $n$  (each  $x_i$  is a 'prize').
- Let  $\pi(x_i) = \pi_i$  the probability of receiving 'prize'  $x_i$ , and define

$$\Delta X = \left\{ \pi \in \mathbb{R}^n : \forall i \pi_i \geq 0, \text{ and } \sum_{i=1}^n \pi_i = 1 \right\}$$

- $\Delta X$  is a convex subset of the vector space  $\mathbb{R}^n$ .
  - An element of  $\Delta X$  identifies a lottery over the elements of  $X$  (the 'prizes').
  - The degenerate lottery that yields  $x$  with certainty is called a **Dirac lottery** on  $x$  and denoted  $\delta_x$ ;
    - $\delta_{x_k}$  is the unit vector in the direction  $k$ :  $\delta_{x_k} = (0_1, \dots, 0_{k-1}, 1_k, 0_{k+1}, \dots, 0_n)$ .
    - The set of Dirac lotteries is  $\{\delta_x : x \in X\} \subset \Delta X$ , and it constitutes the extreme points of  $\Delta X$  (what are the extreme points?).


$\succsim$  is defined over  $\Delta X$

### Remark


A preference relation ranks probability distributions over a *fixed* finite set of objects. Since the set of prizes is fixed, the decision maker's preference order is over lotteries.

## Lotteries

- If  $X = \{x_1, x_2, x_3\}$ , a typical lottery  $\pi$  is described using an event tree:




- Then  $\delta_{x_2}$ , the degenerate lottery which yields  $x_2$  with certainty, is:



- The space  $\Delta X$  assumes all uncertainty is resolved at one point in time; it does not allow for compound lotteries (lotteries over lotteries).
  - This domain restriction can be justified by introducing a 'reduction of compound lotteries' assumption as to reduce every compound lottery to a single lottery in  $\Delta X$ .

## Compound Lotteries

- The convex combination  $\alpha\pi + (1 - \alpha)\sigma$  might be interpreted as the compound lottery which yields  $\pi$  with probability  $\alpha$  and  $\sigma$  with probability  $1 - \alpha$ .
- If compounded correctly, this yields the same probabilities on consequences as  $\alpha\pi + (1 - \alpha)\sigma$ :




- This **assumes** the decision maker compounds correctly (can we state this assumption?).
  - Suppose  $Z$  is a finite subset of  $\Delta X$ . A lottery  $\pi \in \Delta Z$  is a compound lottery, because it is a lottery over lotteries. If one takes a  $\pi \in Z$  then  $\delta_\pi$  is an element of  $\Delta X$ , a lottery over  $X$ .

## Independence and Lotteries

*Independence:* for all  $\pi, \pi', \sigma \in \Delta X$  and  $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ ,

$$\pi \succsim \pi' \Leftrightarrow \alpha\pi + (1 - \alpha)\sigma \succsim \alpha\pi' + (1 - \alpha)\sigma$$

Hence:



- The decision maker cares only about paths which differ.
- This is a 'normative' justification for the independence axiom on  $\Delta X$ .

## Expected Utility

### Things we already know

- Under completeness, transitivity and continuity: there exists a continuous utility function representing the preferences.
- If  $X$  is convex, replace continuity with the Archimedean axiom and add independence: that utility function is affine.

- Under the extra structure given by  $\Delta X$ , the representation theorem identifies a function  $v : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  such that the preference  $\succsim$  is represented by the function

$$U(\pi) = \sum_{i=1}^n \pi_i v(x_i) = \sum_{x \in X} v(x) \pi(x)$$

- DM weights the utility of each outcome by the probability of receiving that outcome.
- The probability distribution over prizes  $\pi$  is given; hence the theorem identifies, via preferences, the functional form of  $U(\cdot)$  and the function  $v(\cdot)$ .

### Remark

- By letting  $v_i = v(x_i)$  for  $i = 1, \dots, n$ , the function  $v$  yields a vector  $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{R}^n$ . The expected utility formula is the dot product of two vectors ( $\mathbf{v}$  and  $\pi$ ) in  $\mathbb{R}^n$ .



## Expected Utility Theorem

### Theorem (Expected Utility Theorem, von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947)

Given a finite set  $X$ , the preference relation  $\succsim$  on  $\Delta X$  (the set of all probability distributions on  $X$ ) is complete, transitive, independent, and Archimedean if and only if there exists a function  $v : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  such that  $\succsim$  is represented by

$$U(\pi) = \sum_{x \in X} v(x)\pi(x)$$

This representation is unique up to affine transformations.

- $U$  represents  $\succsim$  means:  $\pi \succsim \rho \Leftrightarrow U(\pi) \geq U(\rho)$ .
- Uniqueness means:  $U'(\pi) = \sum_x v'(x)\pi(x)$  also represents  $\succsim$  if and only if there exist  $a > 0$  and  $b \in \mathbb{R}$  such that  $v'(x) = av(x) + b$  for all  $x \in X$ .

### Remark

- The function  $v$  is called *von Neumann & Morgenstern utility index* or *Bernoulli utility*.
  - $v : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is **not** the representation of  $\succsim$ ; its domain is  $X$ , which is **not** equal to  $\Delta X$ .
  - The utility index  $v$  is a component of the utility representation given by  $U$ , which is defined on  $\Delta X$  (the correct domain).

# Necessity and Uniqueness in vNM's Expected Utility Theorem

## Question 3, Problem Set 5

### 1 Necessity ( $\Leftarrow$ ) part of vNM's Expected Utility Theorem

If there exists a vNM index  $v : X \rightarrow \mathbf{R}$  such that  $u(\pi) = \sum_{x \in X} v(x)\pi(x)$  is a utility representation of  $\succsim$ , then  $\succsim$  is independent and Archimedean.

### 2 Uniqueness part of vNM's Expected Utility Theorem

Let  $U(\pi) = \sum_x v(x)\pi(x)$  be a utility representation of  $\succsim$ . Then,

$U'(\pi) = \sum_x v'(x)\pi(x)$  is also representation of  $\succsim$  if and only if there exist  $a > 0$  and  $b \in \mathbb{R}$  such that  $v'(x) = av(x) + b$  for all  $x \in X$ .

- We will see a proof of sufficiency next. It uses the mixture space theorem, so all we need to prove is that the affine function is the expected utility function.

## Sufficiency of vNM's Expected Utility Theorem

### Proof.

Sufficiency ( $\Rightarrow$ ) of vN&M's Expected Utility Theorem

- Let  $X = \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n\}$ ; observe that  $\Delta X$  is a convex subset of  $\mathbb{R}^n$ .
- By the Mixture Space Theorem, there is an affine utility representation  $U : \Delta X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ .
- For each  $i$ , let  $v(x_i) = U(\delta_{x_i})$  (the utility of the Dirac lottery on  $x_i$ ).
  - This yields a function  $v : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  and pins down the utility value of each prize.
- Pick some  $\pi \in \Delta X$  and denote  $\pi_i = \pi(x_i)$ .
  - Verify that  $\pi = \sum_{i=1}^n \pi(x_i) \delta_{x_i} = \sum_{i=1}^n \pi_i \delta_{x_i}$ 
    - this follows because  $\delta_{x_i}$  is the unit vector pointing in the  $i$ -th dimension.
- Since  $U$  is affine, each  $\pi_i \geq 0$  and  $\sum_{i=1}^n \pi_i = 1$ , we know (Q4, PS 5) that

$$U(\pi) = U\left(\sum_{i=1}^n \pi_i \delta_{x_i}\right) = \sum_{i=1}^n \pi_i U(\delta_{x_i})$$

- By construction, this implies

$$U(\pi) = \sum_{i=1}^n \pi_i v(x_i) = \sum_{x \in X} \pi(x) v(x).$$



## Expected Utility with Infinitely Many Prizes

- Allowing infinitely many prizes requires some more advanced functional analysis, and introduces some tricky issues.
- Suppose the real line is the space of consequences, what is the equivalent of  $\Delta X$ ? Call it  $\Delta^*\mathbb{R}$ .
  - $\Delta^*\mathbb{R}$  the space of (Borel) probability measures on  $\mathbb{R}$ , or
  - $\Delta^*\mathbb{R}$  the set of density functions on  $\mathbb{R}$  with finite variance, or...
- For each choice one needs the appropriate version of “continuity”.

### Theorem

*The preference relation  $\succsim$  on  $\Delta^*\mathbb{R}$  is complete, transitive, independent, and “continuous” if and only if there exists a “particular”  $v : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  such that*

$$U(f) = \int v(x)f(x)dx$$

*is a representation of  $\succsim$ .*

## Next Class

- Subjective vs. Objective Probability
- Anscombe and Aumann Acts
- State Independence
- Subjective Expected Utility